The governance context in any society is widely affected by the
political system which is the main determinant of the size and nature of the
sphere of interaction between society forces. One political system widely
adapted by a large number of countries is democracy (Weber, 2007). Democracy is an ambiguous concept with no pinned
down definition (Abrahamson, 2000 p. 67).
However, one side of the concept, and this is related to this thesis context,
looks at how it organizes the state and civil society participation.
Literature defines a number of components of democracy. These are,
first, broad competition among individuals and groups for the major positions
of power; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection
of leaders and policies; and a level of civil and political liberties in
order to guarantee the reliability of political competition and participation (Weber, 2007, drawing from Dahl, 1971; Martinussen,
2003 p. 195).
Nonetheless, many contemporary democracies in the South have adopted
only minimalist form of participatory models, arguing that applying
participation in wider ways is unrealistic (Abrahamson,
2000). Participation is limited to elections, leaving other areas of
society administration exclusively in the hands of the state. This indicates
that participation is not a given result of democracy. Rather, any democratic
system under study should be analysed in order to identify the existence and
functioning of participation spaces within its institutional context. However,
despite the minimal participatory model within the democracies of the South,
many of these have increasingly shifted towards decentralisation, enabling a
potential space for participation at the local level (Weber, 2007, drawing from McCarney,
et al., 1995 p. 121).
Decentralisation is not a new concept within international development
circles and is increasingly adopted by the democracies of the South as the
tenet of ‘good governance’. Furthermore, government decentralisation is
considered a gradual process of reform where powers, functions,
responsibilities and resources (administrative, political, economic, and land
issues) are transferred from central to local governments - and/or to other
decentralized entities howsoever defined – which are closer, better understood
and more easily influenced by the public. This is because decentralized
governance is believed to provide a structural arrangement that secures better
interaction among society forces to promote development. This has the potential
to enhance the level of civil society participation in local governance and
development process (Wekwete, 2004; Kauzya,
2004).
The increasing belief in this connection between decentralised
governance and civil society participation is due to the fact that decentralisation
has the potential to address key obstacles to sustainable development such as
“the severe limitations of centralized planning and management; the over-concentration
of power, authority, and resources at the centre; the weak contact between government
and local people, including civil society and the private sector; the lack of
equity in the allocation of resources; the insufficient representation of
various political, religious, ethnic and tribal groups in the decision-making
process; the inadequate exchange of information; and the inefficiency of
service delivery modalities” (Wekwete, 2004 p.
5). Moreover, government decentralisation is believed to be able to
place power within the level of government that is most knowledgeable about the
needs of the public. Thus, this government has the potential to produce and
implement far more responsive development policies and outcomes than the
government of the centre which is politically, physically, and mentally distant
from the people (Wekwete, 2004).
However, although many countries of the South are promoting
decentralisation as a measurement of ‘good governance’ and ‘democracy’, it is
important to note that there is only little evidence that decentralization has
performed positively at all times and in all places. Some countries have put in
place policies of decentralization but they lack the essential capacities for
their implementation. Others are still politically hesitant, not sure of, or
maybe not willing to acknowledge, the role of decentralized governance in
democratization, people empowerment, and poverty reduction (Kauzya, 2004). Therefore, it is restrictive to
assume the existence of a definite relationship between democratic
decentralization, local governance and poverty reduction, or between democratic
participation and allocative efficiency (Wekwete,
2004; Weber, 2007).
Hence, it is important to recognise
the limits of increasing adoption of decentralisation in the countries of the
South as a measurement of good governance and democracy. More power,
responsibilities and resources are allocated at the local level of the
government and this, sometimes, has the potential to increase civil society
participation and development efficiency. However, it is important to
acknowledge that increased participation is not a definite outcome of
decentralised government, but the local governance institutional context is an
important determinant of the existence and function of civil society
participation.
The governance characteristics within any given context are usually
determined by a legal framework that organises the social actors’ relations and
those of their institutional forms. This applies to the urban context where
urban development, urban management and the processes of urbanisation are
enabled via certain regulatory frameworks (formal or informal) which form the
urban development mental models in any given context.
In this, the urban development legal framework is the determinant of levels of
participation in urban development process. Giving participation institutional
characteristics shaped by a legal framework is fundamental to creating space
for civil society to participate in urban development within the governance
context examined. This was introduced in the countries of the North during the
late 1960s and early 1970s by laying down laws that made public consultation a
statutory requirement for urban decision-making (Sewell,
et al., 1977).
However, decision-making within the urban context, and other
governance areas, is not fully structured by the formal legal framework. Many
countries of the South have experienced dramatic political, social and economic
changes which have translated into a high pace of urbanisation, hence urban
development frameworks and their related institutional structures, where they were
embedded, became out of date (Azevedo, 1998 p.
260). Consequently, informal approaches to urban development
decision-making have prevailed, establishing a new framework of urban
institutions. According to Healey (1997),
systems of clientelism and patronage are two examples of these approaches where
legal and non-legal factors of urban development decision-making overlap via
socially based interactive relations between politicians and officials (Healey, 1997). These informal practices of
urban development decision-making are often hidden from democratic scrutiny and
are usually considered a form of corruption. Nonetheless, informal practices
have also proven capable of enabling a wider space of civil society
participation, and in some cases control, in/over urban development
decision-making.
It is important to recognise the
vitality of institutionalising participation in a formal legal framework to
create a space for civil society input in land-use urban decision-making.
Having said this, it is also important to acknowledge and understand the
existence and efficiency of informal approaches to land-use decision-making and
the socially-based linkages of these with the formal institutionalism of urban
decision-making.
