Monday, 22 December 2014

New Publication: Civil Society Participation in Urban Development in Countries of the South: The Case of Syria



Sacha Hasan & Christopher McWilliams (2014): Civil Society Participation in
Urban Development in Countries of the South: The Case of Syria, International Planning Studies,
DOI: 10.1080/13563475.2014.984663

Taylor & Francis Online
Link to article
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13563475.2014.984663#.VJirTl4gMA

Monday, 27 October 2014

Austerity Urbanism





By Sacha Hasan


The word austerity was defined by Merriam-Webster as a condition of enforced or extreme economy. Since 2010, austerity became the key word to describe the post-crisis times and to index the ongoing notions of stern economic measurements, as the meaning exceeded its classical association with self-discipline, thrift and scarcity to further describe the distinctively neoliberal changing matrixes that are often referred to as ‘these economic times’ (Peck, 2012).

Austerity budgeting in the public sector is promoted by neoliberal script as a ‘common sense’ and a ‘necessity’ to respond to the market conditions and failures (Peck, 2012; Fanelli and Paulson, 2010). In this, the state maintains a cult-like privileging of individual economic liberties and personal responsibility, rolling privatisation as fiscal necessities, shifting from the universal, public provision of social services to market provision with attached user fees, lowering of taxation between jurisdictions, and tax-shifting from businesses to consumers and from property owners to the users of city services (Peck, 2012; Fanelli and Paulson, 2010; Harvey, 2005).In other words, austerity contributes to press for "yet smaller small-state settlements at the urban scale" where the most vulnerable social groups are affected (Peck, 2012, p. 626), and this is the terrain of neoliberal urbanism, which is defined by Fanelli and Paulson (2010, p. 4)as:

"... a range of uneven urban processes taking place simultaneously in the communities where we live and work. This includes the privatization, restructuring, or elimination of public goods and municipal services; the shifting of the cost of maintenance of public resources onto the working class; the increasing precariousness of work; the devolution of responsibilities onto local governments without matching fiscal supports; the scaling of regulatory capacities upwards to regional or international institutions (characterized by little transparency, accountability, or public consultation); the reining in of the power of municipal unions and community groups; the scaling back of social entitlement programs; and expansion of so-called 'public-private partnerships' that shift some of the responsibility for urban governance to corporations".

Changing governance and downloading responsibilities have always been the key results of neoliberal government, as it sees governance to be a potential threat to individual rights and constitutional liberties, and democracy to be a luxury and hardly guarantees political stability (Hackworth, 2007; Harvey, 2005; 2012; Peck, 2011; 2012). Alternatively, neoliberals prefer governance by experts and elites, where issues are governed by executive order and judicial decisions rather than democratic and parliamentary decision-making (Harvey, 2005). These are seen to help create and promote a business climate and stable political system. However, practice has shown that neoliberal measures have biases especially at the time of crises. These arise in particular out of "the treatment of labour and the environment as mere commodities" (Harvey, 2005, p. 70). With more focus during times of conflict, like the current fiscal crisis, the typical neoliberal state sides with a good business climate at the expense of collective rights of labour and the capacity of the environment to (re)generate itself. Furthermore, the neoliberal state favours "the integrity of the financial system and the solvency of financial institutions over the well-being of population or environmental qualities" (Harvey, 2005, p. 70-71). When doing this, the neoliberal state aims to restore class power, by limiting state action and focussing on privatisation (‘rolling-back’ of the state) and individual power. However, once again there is a contradiction between theory and practise, as the neoliberal state, especially at the time of conflict, has showed great intervention to create institutional reforms for the benefit of the economic recovery of the elite, through accumulation by dispossession (see Harvey, 2005).Therefore, it is accepted to say that fiscal cutback is a recurrent condition of neoliberal government, despite its proven frequent episodes of over-reach, failure and crisis (see Peck et al., 2010; McBride and Whiteside, 2011).

Reflecting on this and when examining the effects of austerity, since the contemporary crisis began in 2008, and reaching its peak in 2010 when David Cameron came to power, the state, local government, and cities in particular are exposed to the full force of extreme economy. However, the applied austerity measures are not a mere rerun of the 1980s fiscal cutbacks, but a selective consolidation and intensification of their underlying logics and contradictions, resulting in cumulative political, social, institutional and fiscal effects. Thus, more than being a temporary fiscal fasting, austerity economy has led to the cumulative incapacitation of the state; this is driving the current urban crisis (Peck, 2012). This is due to the deeper resulting patterns of structural imbalances between cities governments' revenuesand their ongoing commitments to public services and workforce which are greatly renegotiated, as the preferred targets of austerity programmes are the poor, minorities and marginalised populations, public-sector unions and bureaucratised infrastructures (Peck 2012).

In the US, the majority of cities were bites for austerityare now evident ,they begun to fashion their own fiscal arrangements of reductions in staffing and service levels under the circumstances of falling revenues and structural deficits. While ordinary austerity is encouraging city governments to cut budgets and attempt innovative models of sourcing and privatisation (Peck, 2012).

Nonetheless, it is argued that austerity has failed, as it contributed to worsen and lengthen the crises rather than solve it (Fanelli and Paulson, 2010; Peck 2012). In relation to the geographical context of the proposed research, austerity budgeting showed no signs of success in Europe (Peck, 2012), as growth has slowed (e.g. the UK) or failed all together (e.g. Greece and Spain), protests have been provoked along with opposing movements on both the right and the left, and the hopes for pro-austerity government succession have collapsed (Peck, 2012).Furthermore, this 'severe economy' does not seem to be a passing moment, but a proposed institutional system designed for years to come (Pew Charitable Trust, 2012),because the resulting signs show that cities are expected to fall into line in the age of austerity (Edsall, 2012; Featherstone, et al., 2012).

However, the rationale of austerity starting to take effect since 2008 is defining a new terrain to neoliberalism. This is because it is being examined under distinctive historical and geographical conditions, in the context of already neoliberalised models of local state power and urban politics (Peck, 2012). Therefore, the proposed research suggests the importance to critically examine the features of the emerging ongoing institutional landscapes systemised by the current neoliberal government, as rather than a target, the crisis could be seen to serve as an excuse for  neoliberal governments to achieve two key goals: "the subjection of all workers to strict market discipline, and the political disorganization of the Left" (Fanelli and Paulson, 2010 drawing from Evans, 2009; Rosenfeld, 2009; Alboand Rosenfeld, 2009). This agrees with Krugman's argument (2012, p. A27) which points out that, "the austerity derive... isn't really about debt and deficits at all; it's about using deficit panic as an excuse to dismantle social programmes... economic recovery was never the point; the drive for austerity [is] about using the crisis, not solving it".

Therefore, the impacts of austerity extreme economy has started to take an urban dimension, highlighting certain features that can define austerity economy as an emergent form of neoliberal urbanism, which is austerity urbanism (Peck, 2012).This is because the cumulative effects of austerity extreme end are immediately revealed in the downsizing of public sector workforces, resulting in "back-office and front-line cuts in fields like education, healthcare and welfare [, ]and this will likely be spatially concentrated and socially regressive, compounding the effects of service withdrawals themselves" (Peck, 2012, p. 648). Furthermore, austerity urbanism has started to reach more deeply into ‘hard to reform’ fields (e.g. the welfare state, comprising grant-dependent institutions engaged in service-delivery roles in the community, non-profit and faith-based sectors) (Peck, 2012). This is in addition to the massive privatisation of the public sector (including land and property sites, user fees and service management). This will result in infrastructure development to become more highly dependent on public-private partnership, favouring projects that promise attractive returns. This is while leaving the public-sector developments to face intensifying management and financing difficulties, shifting responsibilities to local city governments that are expected to be 'creative' as to solve the mismatches and imbalances between the local capacities and what is expected from them, leading to hollow urban development policy-making initiatives in order to fill the resulting credibility vacuum (Peck, 2012). For local city governments to absorb these institutional shortcomings and their unaffordable costs, they tend to 'offload themselves'; reductions in social- service delivery and the adoption of fee-based systems will especially affect low-income populations, women and minority groups (Peck, 2012).

These features altogether have gone beyond being of immediate neoliberal characteristics (similar to those of the 1980s), but becoming an indirect drive of ongoing organisational transformation named austerity urbanism. This form of urban politics is defined by Peck (2012, p. 651),

"... to be understood as a particular mutation of neoliberal urbanism, unevenly realized and still no more than emergent in some respects, it is also important to acknowledge that the systemic imposition of fiscal discipline hardly represents a ‘new’ departure in the context of the shape-shifting, nonlinear dynamics of neoliberalisation. [...] however, this does not define a sustainable course. Beyond its internal contradictions, austerity urbanism has already become a site of struggle in its own right, though it remains to be seen whether the latest wave of occupations, pro- tests and resistance efforts will mutate into a politics of transformation".

However, it is important to note that the concept is very contested, as despite a number of emergent features of the concept can be highlighted, these greatly vary from one context to another in terms of severity and effect (Peck, 2012). Thus, having and end abstract definition can be unrealistic, and is not the purpose. The aim here is rather to develop an understanding of the concept and its relation to the examined context.

Tuesday, 13 May 2014

The role of democracy, decentralisation and planning legislation in defining urban governance context


The governance context in any society is widely affected by the political system which is the main determinant of the size and nature of the sphere of interaction between society forces. One political system widely adapted by a large number of countries is democracy (Weber, 2007). Democracy is an ambiguous concept with no pinned down definition (Abrahamson, 2000 p. 67). However, one side of the concept, and this is related to this thesis context, looks at how it organizes the state and civil society participation.

Literature defines a number of components of democracy. These are, first, broad competition among individuals and groups for the major positions of power; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies; and a level of civil and political liberties in order to guarantee the reliability of political competition and participation (Weber, 2007, drawing from Dahl, 1971; Martinussen, 2003 p. 195).

Nonetheless, many contemporary democracies in the South have adopted only minimalist form of participatory models, arguing that applying participation in wider ways is unrealistic (Abrahamson, 2000). Participation is limited to elections, leaving other areas of society administration exclusively in the hands of the state. This indicates that participation is not a given result of democracy. Rather, any democratic system under study should be analysed in order to identify the existence and functioning of participation spaces within its institutional context. However, despite the minimal participatory model within the democracies of the South, many of these have increasingly shifted towards decentralisation, enabling a potential space for participation at the local level (Weber, 2007, drawing from McCarney, et al., 1995 p. 121).

Decentralisation is not a new concept within international development circles and is increasingly adopted by the democracies of the South as the tenet of ‘good governance’. Furthermore, government decentralisation is considered a gradual process of reform where powers, functions, responsibilities and resources (administrative, political, economic, and land issues) are transferred from central to local governments - and/or to other decentralized entities howsoever defined – which are closer, better understood and more easily influenced by the public. This is because decentralized governance is believed to provide a structural arrangement that secures better interaction among society forces to promote development. This has the potential to enhance the level of civil society participation in local governance and development process (Wekwete, 2004; Kauzya, 2004).

The increasing belief in this connection between decentralised governance and civil society participation is due to the fact that decentralisation has the potential to address key obstacles to sustainable development such as “the severe limitations of centralized planning and management; the over-concentration of power, authority, and resources at the centre; the weak contact between government and local people, including civil society and the private sector; the lack of equity in the allocation of resources; the insufficient representation of various political, religious, ethnic and tribal groups in the decision-making process; the inadequate exchange of information; and the inefficiency of service delivery modalities” (Wekwete, 2004 p. 5). Moreover, government decentralisation is believed to be able to place power within the level of government that is most knowledgeable about the needs of the public. Thus, this government has the potential to produce and implement far more responsive development policies and outcomes than the government of the centre which is politically, physically, and mentally distant from the people (Wekwete, 2004).

However, although many countries of the South are promoting decentralisation as a measurement of ‘good governance’ and ‘democracy’, it is important to note that there is only little evidence that decentralization has performed positively at all times and in all places. Some countries have put in place policies of decentralization but they lack the essential capacities for their implementation. Others are still politically hesitant, not sure of, or maybe not willing to acknowledge, the role of decentralized governance in democratization, people empowerment, and poverty reduction (Kauzya, 2004). Therefore, it is restrictive to assume the existence of a definite relationship between democratic decentralization, local governance and poverty reduction, or between democratic participation and allocative efficiency (Wekwete, 2004; Weber, 2007).

Hence, it is important to recognise the limits of increasing adoption of decentralisation in the countries of the South as a measurement of good governance and democracy. More power, responsibilities and resources are allocated at the local level of the government and this, sometimes, has the potential to increase civil society participation and development efficiency. However, it is important to acknowledge that increased participation is not a definite outcome of decentralised government, but the local governance institutional context is an important determinant of the existence and function of civil society participation.

The governance characteristics within any given context are usually determined by a legal framework that organises the social actors’ relations and those of their institutional forms. This applies to the urban context where urban development, urban management and the processes of urbanisation are enabled via certain regulatory frameworks (formal or informal) which form the urban development mental models in any given context. In this, the urban development legal framework is the determinant of levels of participation in urban development process. Giving participation institutional characteristics shaped by a legal framework is fundamental to creating space for civil society to participate in urban development within the governance context examined. This was introduced in the countries of the North during the late 1960s and early 1970s by laying down laws that made public consultation a statutory requirement for urban decision-making (Sewell, et al., 1977).

However, decision-making within the urban context, and other governance areas, is not fully structured by the formal legal framework. Many countries of the South have experienced dramatic political, social and economic changes which have translated into a high pace of urbanisation, hence urban development frameworks and their related institutional structures, where they were embedded, became out of date (Azevedo, 1998 p. 260). Consequently, informal approaches to urban development decision-making have prevailed, establishing a new framework of urban institutions. According to Healey (1997), systems of clientelism and patronage are two examples of these approaches where legal and non-legal factors of urban development decision-making overlap via socially based interactive relations between politicians and officials (Healey, 1997). These informal practices of urban development decision-making are often hidden from democratic scrutiny and are usually considered a form of corruption. Nonetheless, informal practices have also proven capable of enabling a wider space of civil society participation, and in some cases control, in/over urban development decision-making.

It is important to recognise the vitality of institutionalising participation in a formal legal framework to create a space for civil society input in land-use urban decision-making. Having said this, it is also important to acknowledge and understand the existence and efficiency of informal approaches to land-use decision-making and the socially-based linkages of these with the formal institutionalism of urban decision-making.

LGBTQ refugees and asylum seekers and the hostile legislative environment in the UK

                                      Author: Dr. Sacha Hasan Abstract: This review examines the prominent threats facing LGBTQ refugees...